OVERVIEW OF CONTAINMENT FILTERED VENT UNDER SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS AT WOLSONG NPP UNIT 1  by SONG, Y.M. et al.
OVERVIEW OF CONTAINMENT FILTERED VENT UNDER
SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS AT WOLSONG NPP UNIT 1
Y.M. SONG*, H.S. JEONG, S.Y. PARK, D.H. KIM, and J.H. SONG
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
989-111, Daedeok-daero, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, Korea
*Corresponding author. E-mail :ymsong@kaeri.re.kr
Received August 31, 2013
1. INTRODUCTION
A CFVS is intended to protect against a loss of integrity
of the containment in the event of an internal over pressur-
ization after a severe accident, and to thereby reduce the
land contamination and health risk issues. This technique
has been studied for more than 25 years [1], and has been
applied to nuclear power plants mainly in Europe [2] and
Canada [3].
Unlike PWRs, CANDU plants have about twice the
coolant inventory that can be released from the reactor
vessel (=calandria vessel). If ex-vessel coolant inventory
is included, more than triple the mass is possible. Most of
it will become steam under severe accident conditions such
as an SBO (Station BlackOut) with a simultaneous loss of
cooling caused by the secondary side of the steam generator,
ECC (Emergency Core Cooling) heat exchangers, and
moderator heat exchangers. Furthermore, if local air coolers
(LACs) do not operate as designed, the pressure of the
containment (i.e., the reactor building in the Wolsong plant)
will increase to over the ultimate failure pressure in the
long run. In contrast, the design and failure pressures of
the CANDU reactor building (RB) are less than one-half
that of PWRs. Hence, steam over pressurization is a big
threat to the integrity of the CANDU RB if no recovery
action can be taken for a long period of time, as in the case
of the Fukushima incident.
Wolsong unit 1 (WS-1) was recently chosen to be
backfitted with a wet-style CFVS. If the operational strategy
of the CFVS is well established, it will greatly reduce the
threat from a steam over pressurization failure mode of
the WS-1 RB. In addition, it will minimize the uncontrolled
releases of airborne particulate radionuclides and radioiodine
isotopes into the environment by means of controlled
filtering. In this study, the anticipated effects of a CFVS
are analyzed using the ISAAC (Integrated Severe Accident
Analysis code for CANDU plants) computer code [4], which
was developed in Korea. As both the design specification
and mechanical models for a CFVS are not available at
this time, an RB leak and/or rupture are assumed, and a
change in the inner RB conditions reflecting the thermal
hydraulic requirements for the CFVS performance is ana-
lyzed. From this study, it is expected that the positive and
possible negative effects of a CFVS with different vent sizes
and operational strategies under a hypothetically severe
SBO accident will be elucidated.
2. ISAAC CALCULATION TOOL
The current study uses version 4.0.3 of the ISAAC
computer code [5]. The ISAAC computer code is a flexible,
efficient, and integrated tool for evaluating the in-plant
effects of a wide range of postulated accidents and for
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examining the impact of operator actions on accident pro-
gressions. The code can predict the progression of hypo-
thetical accident sequences from a set of initiating events
to either a safe, stable, and coolable state, or to an impaired
RB and depressurization.
The ISAAC code is constructed into modules covering
individual regions of the plant: the primary heat transport
system (PHTS), pressurizer, steam generators, calandria
vessel (CV), reactor vault (RV), end-shields, degasser
condenser tank, and the RB. All major engineered safety
features are represented in the code: the shutdown cooling
system, emergency core cooling system, moderator and
shield cooling system, local air coolers, igniters, a passive
autocatalytic recombiner (PAR), and a dousing spray system.
The code evaluates a wide spectrum of phenomena
including steam formation; core heat-up; cladding oxidation
and hydrogen evolution; vessel failure; corium-concrete
interactions; ignition of combustible gases; fluid entrainment
by high-velocity gases; and fission-product release, transport,
and deposition. The code also addresses important engi-
neered safety systems and allows a user to model the
operator interventions. Furthermore, models are added to
characterize actions that could stop an accident, i.e., in-
vessel cooling, external cooling of the calandria vessel,
and ex-vessel cooling. Moreover, mathematical techniques
are implemented to maintain a quick-running code suitable
for extensive accident screening and parameter sensitivity
analysis applications.
The ISAAC code was developed on the basis of the
MAAP4 PWR (pressurized water reactor) code and includes
three main groups of models: (1) generic models developed
for light water reactors (LWRs), (2) CANDU6-specific
engineered safety system models, and (3) CANDU6-specific
models for a horizontal core, figure-of-eight primary heat
transport system, and the calandria. The generic models
of ISAAC evolved from the MAAP4 code, which was
developed by Fauske and Associates. LLC (FAI), for PWRs.
Some of these models required minor modifications to adapt
them to the CANDU6 design features for integration with
the rest of the code, but these models were fundamentally
unchanged from the generic MAAP4 versions. As the
CANDU6 type reactor differs from typical PWRs, the
CANDU6-specific features are newly modeled and added
to the ISAAC code. The CANDU6-specific models include
the calandria vessel, end shields, reactor vault, pressure and
inventory control, and engineered safety systems (e.g.,
dousing, ECC). One of the most important distinguishing
features between ISAAC and other MAAP4 versions is
the CANDU reactor core with fuel bundles situated inside
horizontal pressure and calandria tubes. In addition, the
large quantities of relatively cool water (moderator and
reactor vault water) provide significant heat sinks, distin-
guishing the CANDU models from LWR models.
ISAAC models a broad spectrum of physical processes
that might occur in the core during an accident, such as the
followings:
- Fuel and fuel channel temperature excursions, defor-
mation of the fuel and fuel channels, and interactions
with the moderator system;
- Zirconium-steam exothermic reaction;
- Thermal mechanical failures of the fuel channels;
- Disassembly of the fuel channels;
- Formation of suspended debris beds;
- Motion of solid and molten debris; and
- Interaction of the core debris with water
In particular, ISAAC models the CANDU feeders, end-
fittings, fuel channels, and fuel. The ISAAC models concen-
trate on the behavior of these core components within the
CV as the fuel channels disassemble, form suspended debris
supported by intact channels, and relocate the suspended
debris to the debris bed within the CV. Each characteristic
channel represents a larger number of channels (known
as associated channels) with similar powers, elevations,
and feeder geometries.
The ISAAC PHTS thermal hydraulic models are sim-
plified using such assumptions as coarse nodalization,
equilibrium within the fluid phase, a uniform loop pressure,
and a single global void fraction at which a phase separation
occurs. The ISAAC PHTS thermal hydraulics results cannot
be expected to be as accurate as those from more detailed
PHTS models associated with a thermal hydraulic code
such as CATHENA. Most importantly, however, ISAAC
is an integrated code that models the interactions amongst
many systems modeled in an integrated fashion. Thus,
ISAAC calculates the effects of the interplay between the
RB, CV, PHTS, reactor vault, core, etc. In addition, ISAAC
has the ability to input operator actions by enabling, disa-
bling, or modifying a system at the user’s request.
3. BASE SCENARIO ANALYSIS FOR
HYPOTHETICAL SEVERE ACCIDENT
An SBO scenario, where all off-site power is lost and
the diesel generators fail, is simulated as an initiating event
of a severe accident sequence. The scenario has been taken
as a very low-frequency, but high-risk, accident event. All
current generation reactors are only partially designed to
cope with a station blackout. During an SBO event, the
initiating event (time = 0 s) is a loss of Class IV and Class
III power, causing a loss of pumps used in systems such
as the PHTS, moderator cooling, shield cooling, steam
generator feed water, and recirculating cooling water. The
SBO scenario does not credit any of these active heat sinks,
but relies only on the passive heat sinks, particularly the
initial water inventories of the PHTS, moderator, the
secondary side of the steam generator, end shields, and the
reactor vault. This scenario succeeds in the operation of a
reactor shutdown, reactor building isolation, dousing spray,
and PARs, but the LACs are unavailable. The following
several assumptions have been made for the analyses in
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this paper (normally, the best-estimate assumptions were
used for this study, but when the availability of the data
related to modeling a certain process was limited, conserv-
ative assumptions were applied):
• The reactor is at full power (2157.5 MW(th)) initially
and a reactor shutdown occurs upon an accident
initiation through a complete loss of Class IV power.
• The RB dousing spray system was credited and an RB
pressurization up to 114 kPa(a) triggers dousing, the
total capacity of which is 1,559 m3 of water inventory
and a maximum water flow rate of 6,800 kg/sec [6].
• A total of 27 PARs are credited in the WS-1 plant [7].
The PARs are intended to be activated with an assumed
time delay of 1,800 s after the hydrogen concentration
first reaches 2%. After starting, the PARs run until
the local hydrogen concentration decreases to 0.2%.
Subsequently, the PARs are intentionally started with
no delay; whenever the hydrogen concentration is
greater than 2%, provided there is sufficient oxygen
available.
• A simple model for RB leakage was used, the max-
imum leak rate of which was 0.5% of the RB volume
at an RB design pressure of 224 kPa(a), during 24
hours [6]. The RB failure is assumed to occur with a
size of 0.1m2 at a pressure of 426 kPa(a), which is
equivalent to a 50% cumulative probability of the
50% confidence interval (i.e., the median pressure)
of the WS-1 RB fragility curve [8].
The simulations were performed using ISAAC 4.0.3,
and the simulations were run up to 500,000 s (139 h),
including the corium behavior even after an RV bottom
concrete melt-through (when compared with a PWR, severe
accident progression tends to be delayed in a PHWR
because of an abundant initial inventory of the coolant).
The analysis results for the base SBO scenario show
that the PHTS inventory is gradually lost through the LRVs
(liquid relief valves) resulting in a fuel channel dryout,
and the uppermost channel ruptures at about 14,300 s. A
significant quantity of the moderator inventory is discharged
into the RB when the fuel channel rupture pressurizes the
CV. Several top fuel channel rows are uncovered during
this process. After the initial rapid moderator expulsion,
the moderator continues to discharge gradually into the
RB as a result of the continued moderator boil off owing
to the heat transfer from the core. Following core material
relocation, the remaining water in the CV eventually boils
off and the moderator inside the CV is depleted at about
43,800 s.
The water in the RV acts as a heat sink to cool the
external CV wall [9], and water in the RV begins to boil
off at about 60,000 s resulting in a gradual decrease of the
RV water level. The water level in the RV reaches the CV
bottom at about 156,800 s when the CV bottom heats up
rapidly and fails from a creep. Eventually, all water in the
RV dries out (at about 175,000 s) and the corium then reacts
with the concrete floor. When the eroded depth of the con-
crete reaches 2 m, the concrete floor of the RV is considered
to fail at about 434,000 s. Following the RV failure, the
corium interacts with the water in the RB basement.
Fig. 1 shows the pressure in the RB node representing
the steam generator room. After accident initiation, the RB
pressure increases gradually because water is discharged
into the RB through the PHTS LRVs. The rapid increase
(or decrease) of RB pressure, at approximate times of
14,300 s, 43,800 s, 60,000 s, 156,800 s, and 434,000 s, can
be explained through the following processes occurring
at these respective times: (1) rupture of the fuel channel, (2)
water dryout in the CV, (3) RV water saturation, (4) CV
failure and corium relocation into the RV, and (5) corium
relocation into the RB basement after RV failure. As men-
tioned above, at about 60,000 s, water in the RV reaches
the saturation temperature and begins to boil off, thus
gradually increasing the RB pressure. At about 74,300 s
(which is between the time of RV water saturation and water
dryout in the RV), the RB pressure reaches the failure set
point of 426 kPa(a), resulting in an RB failure.
4. RISK ASSESSMENT (OF VENTING STRATEGY)
A severe core damage accident in PHWR [10] is an
accident in which substantial damage is done to the reactor
core, whether or not serious off-site consequences occur.
These accidents have a very low frequency and result in
a loss of the geometry of the core, for which a risk assess-
ment is made for the Wolsong-specific scenarios selected
based on the Wolsong PSA results [11].
Once the PHTS has been voided (through a break or
boil-off), further gradual pressurization of the RB will
result from the generation of steam in the CV (as the first
stage) and RV (as the second stage), or from the generation
of non-condensable gases from the interaction of the molten
Fig. 1. Reactor Building Pressure Response for Base SBO
Sequence
core material with the concrete basemat of the RV (as the
third stage). This pressurization process can last from a
few hours to several days, depending upon the stages (for
example, the first stage is shorter than the latter two stages)
and the effectiveness of the engineered safety features.
The LACs are effective in condensing steam produced by
decay heat emanating from the debris, and therefore their
failure must be assumed to consider an RB failure from
steam pressurization. With debris contained within the
CV, a functioning ESC (end shield cooling) removes the
decay heat from the debris to avoid the RB pressurization
(second stage). These gradual RB pressurizations from
steam production are implicitly considered in the Wolsong
PSA.
Fig. 2 shows the RB failure frequencies according to
the failure timings in WS-1 for event sequences in which
severe core damage has occurred. Among the severe core
damage sequences (=100%), 35% of the frequencies result
in no RB failure, but the rest lead to an RB failure, which
can then be grouped into three different failure timings
(i.e., early/late/very late). The most dominant mode of RB
failure is a late RB failure (56.15%). A late RB failure
(the term "late" is used here to represent a relatively late
timing compared with the first containment failure timing
of the PWR) is defined as a failure of the RB before CV
failure. Therefore, the time span of "late" in this context
is from about 20 hours into the accident. A late RB failure
can result from a slow over pressurization process owing
to water vaporization in the RV, energetic late hydrogen
combustion before CV failure, or an in-CV steam explosion
(an alpha mode failure). As shown in Table 1, a late RB
failure occurs mainly owing to the slow steam pressurization
after RV water saturates until the CV fails. The chance of
an alpha mode failure or energetic late hydrogen combustion
is estimated to be negligible. If the long-term RB heat
removal (i.e., LACs) is lost and not recovered, which is
the case for most contributing sequences (more than 99.7%),
the RB should fail before the CV failure. In the mean time,
the remaining failure timing such as an early failure (which
is defined as a failure from an isolation failure or RB bypass
event such as an SGTR (Steam Generator Tube Rupture)
[12] or V-sequence that occurs typically before one day
into the accident) or very late RB failure (which is defined
as the failure of the RB at or after CV failure) is not impor-
tant in terms of steam over pressurization mode, as shown
in Table 1.
As the CFVS is intended to protect the containment
against a loss of integrity in the event of an internal over
pressurization owing to a slow steam pressurization, about
a 56% failure frequency among the total RB failure fre-
quency (65%) is expected to be removed. This means that
the probability of no RB failure will increase from 35%
to about 90% even after severe core damage occurs in WS-
1, if the venting strategy is successful.
5. EVALUATION OF CFVS PERFORMANCE
The peak RB pressure in the base sequence with no RB
failure assumed (‘no-RB-Fail’) is calculated to be about
910 kPa(a), which is caused by rapid steam generation from
the molten corium interaction with the coolant in the RV
just after a CV rupture. As this value is more than double
the failure pressure (i.e., 426 kPa(a)) and is about quadruple
the design pressure (i.e., 224 kPa(a)), CFVS operation is
highly needed.
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Failure Timing
No Failure
Early Failure
Late Failure
Very Late Failure
Total
Failure mode
Corium arrested in CV
No RB failure
Sub Total
Isolation Failure
SGTR
V-sequence
Sub Total
Steam overpressurization
Alpha mode failure
Sub Total
Steam overpressurization
Alpha mode failure
Hydrogen explosion
Sub Total
Probability [%]
27.15 
8.27 
35.42 
0.35 
0.33 
0.04 
0.72 
56.13 
0.02 
56.15 
0.08 
0.07 
7.56 
7.71 
100 
Table 1. RB Failure Mode and Frequency According to Failure
Timings in WS-1
Fig. 2. RB Failure Timing and Frequency in WS-1 NPP
To find a CFVS sizing criteria, a sensitivity study was
made for different venting areas ranging from 0.01 m2 to
0.2 m2, and the characteristics of the RB pressure decrease
were analyzed. As shown in Fig. 3, it takes two hours for
the RB pressure to decrease from the failure pressure to
atmospheric pressure in the case of 0.1 m2, and from the
design pressure to atmospheric pressure in the case of 0.075
m2. Using the definition of failure size in the Wolsong PSA
[11] in which a rupture takes two hours (at the utmost)
for the RB atmosphere (corresponding to a net free volume)
to be fully released, three different sizes, i.e., a rupture
(0.1 m2), boundary (0.075 m2), and leak (0.01 m2), are
defined in this study.
Next, the CFVS operation is assumed to be made
between the actuation and closure pressures to see whether
the RB integrity can be maintained. To evaluate the effects
of the pressure decrease through the CFVS operation, the
RB pressure is calculated with the three different CFVS
sizes defined above. The results are shown in Table 2 and
Fig. 4, and the characteristics of RB pressure are compared
with the case of no CFVS operation (SBO-noCFV) in which
no RB failure ('no-RB-fail') is additionally assumed to show
the pressure difference more clearly. In the CFVS operating
scenarios, the CFVS should have enough capacity such
that the RB pressure can be kept below the failure pressure.
The actuation pressure is generally chosen between the
design and failure pressures while the closure pressure is
chosen between the atmospheric and actuation pressures.
The pressures of 224 kPa(a) and 150 kPa(a) are chosen
as the actuation and closure pressures in the WS-1, for
which optimum operation is provided through an operating
manual [13]. In this study, a higher actuation pressure is
chosen for bounding calculations of CFVS performance
and is set to a 90% value (393 kPa(a)) of the failure pressure
using a 10% operational margin. As this actuation pressure
is higher than the peak pressure (389 kPa(a)) that appeared
at the timing of the water dryout in the CV (12 hours), the
first cycle of CFVS operation is delayed until about 20 hours
into the accident (refer to Fig. 1). In the mean time, two
closure pressures, i.e., 110% of the atmospheric pressure
(110 kPa(a)) and design pressure (224 kPa(a)), were selected
to see the difference in mitigative control of the RB pressure. 
As a result, the RB pressure is controlled between the
CFVS actuation and closure pressures during most accident
periods, but two peak spikes appeared to be uncontrolled.
The first peak occurs at the time of CV failure when corium
is relocated into the RV water. The second peak occurs at
the time of RV (concrete floor) penetration failure when
corium is relocated into the basement water. Both peaks
are from rapid steam pressurization resulting from molten
corium-water interaction. As noted from the second peak
data in Table 2, if the vent area is smaller or the closure
pressure is higher, the peak pressure becomes higher, which
makes the CFVS less successful. The value of the first
peak is inconsistent from the point of the vent area and
closure pressure because the operation history before CV
failure is inconsistent. For example, the CFVS operation
before the timing of the first peak is made once (i.e., single
venting cycle) in a '110-rupture' case, and twice (i.e., double
venting cycle) in a '224-rupture' case. Furthermore, the
value of the first peak in a '110-leak' case is the smallest
because the CFVS is not closed and is still operating (owing
to the small vent size and low closure pressure) at the start
of the peak, which is contrary to the other cases. The highest
peak pressure can appear in any of two peaks depending on
the cases, as shown in the bold letters in Table 2. Throughout
this sensitivity study, RB pressure is successfully controlled
below the failure pressure in only a '224-rupture' case,
which is judged to be the optimal case among the six
calculated cases.
The CFVS shall be implemented as a severe accident
mitigation system used for the purpose of the prevention
of a containment failure from over pressurization through
the controlled filtered venting of the containment following
an accident with severe core damage. For this purpose, the
CFVS should be designed to cope with harsh environmental
conditions including high temperatures and high residual
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Fig. 3. RB Pressure Response to Various Venting Sizes in WS-1
Fig. 4. RB Pressure Response for CFVS Operation
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heat of the filtered aerosols. The CFVS also operates by
passing the vented non-condensable gases and vapors from
the containment atmosphere to remove high activity isotopes
and aerosols to contain or control the radioactive releases.
In Table 3, the requirements for CFVS performance are
briefly analyzed from the viewpoint of thermal hydraulics
where special notice is taken for parameters such as the
incoming gas temperature, incoming steam and hydrogen
masses, and the amount and decay heat of the incoming
fission products.
- The maximum temperature of incoming gas into the
CFVS is about 450–480K. The maximum temperature
appears from the two peak spikes mentioned previ-
ously, and the first peak temperature is higher than
the second peak temperature, as shown in Fig. 5 (for
‘SBO-noCFV’ case with ‘no RB Fail’). If the PAR
does not operate (‘No-PAR’), the temperature can
be decreased by a maximum of about 10ºC.
- In Fig. 6, the accumulated mass of hydrogen generated
until the end of the calculation (500,000 s) is compared
Table 2. RB Pressure Response to Various CFVS Operation Conditions
Event
Sequence
CFVS 
Vent Area [m2]
0 N/A N/A 190 880
CFV Operation Pressure [KPa(a)]
Actuation Closure 1st Peak 2nd Peak
RB Peak Pressure (>43,800 s) [KPa(a)]
SBO-noCFV 
with ‘no-RB-Fail’
110-rupture
110-boundary
110-leak
224-rupture
224-boundary
224-leak
0.1
0.075
0.01
0.1
0.075
0.01
393
393
393
393
393
393
110
110
110
224
224
224
440
470
390
425
480
495
415
440
510
425
475
575
Table 3. Thermal Hydraulic Requirements for CFVS Performance in SBO Sequences
Event
Sequence
Max. temperature of
incoming gas into
CFVS [K]
(475-480) N/A
CFVS Performance Requirement
Accumulated mass until 500K sec [Ton]
SteamH2
Total amount of CsI
vented until
500Ksec [%]
Max. decay heat of
FPs
into CFVS [kW]
SBO-noCFV
with ‘no RB Fail’
Base-rupture
Base-boundary
110-rupture
110-boundary
224-rupture
224-boundary
461
462
451
457
452
455
3.5-
2.85
800
795
555
575
415
425
2.65
2.65
1.66
1.58
1.26
1.24
381
379
370
378
303
306
Fig. 5. Temperature Behavior of Gas Inside RB 
(‘SBO-noCFV’ Case with ‘no RB Fail’)
with the released mass from the RB failure, the size
of which is 0.1 m2 (base-rupture), 0.075 m2 (base-
boundary), and 0.01 m2 (base-leak), for the base
sequence. As most hydrogen (=noncondensible gas)
generated is expected to be released until the end of
the calculation regardless of the CFVS operation
strategy, the vent characteristics of hydrogen are not
analyzed. Instead, the release is initiated at an RB
failure pressure of 426 KPa(a) and is not closed
thereafter. For a conservative analysis, no automatic
ignition of hydrogen inside the RB is assumed. All
(about 3.5 tons) of the hydrogen generated inside the
RB is released until 500,000 seconds. The release
response, which depends on the hydrogen amount
accumulated inside the RB and the pressure release
characteristics, is almost the same for the rupture
and boundary sizes, but is somewhat delayed for the
leak size. About 0.5 tons less hydrogen is released
when the PAR is operated (Yes-PAR) while removing
the hydrogen, compared with the case of no PAR
operation (No-PAR). However, no more hydrogen can
be removed by the PARs after about 100,000 s when
the oxygen is depleted inside the RB. This shows that
the CFVS should have the capability to treat that
amount of hydrogen in the SBO base sequence.
- In Fig. 7, the accumulated mass of steam released after
an RB failure at 426 KPa(a) for the base sequence
until the end of calculation is compared with the vented
mass from the CFVS operation. The CFVS operation
is made for the cases ('110-rupture', '110-boundary',
'110-leak', '224-rupture', '224-boundary', and '224-
leak') defined in Table 2. About 800 tons of maximum
steam mass is released if RB failed with the rupture
(‘Base-rupture’) or boundary (‘Base- boundary’)
sizes when the CFVS is not operated. If the CFVS
operates under the presumed conditions, about 415-
575 tons of maximum steam mass is vented depending
on both the interval time of the vent operation and the
vent size. This shows that the CFVS should have the
capability to treat that amount of steam in the vent
cases presumed.
- In Fig. 8, the decay heat of the fission products (FPs)
after RB failure at 426 KPa(a) for the base sequence
is compared with that of the FPs vented from the CFVS
operation. The CFVS operation is made for the same
six cases shown in Fig. 7. The total amount of CsI
(as a representative FP) vented until 500,000 seconds
is shown in Table 3, which is approximately several
percent of the initial inventory. Approximately 380
kW of maximum decay heat is generated by the FPs
released if RB failed with the rupture (‘Base-rupture’)
or boundary (‘Base- boundary’) sizes when the CFVS
is not operated. If the CFVS operates under the pre-
sumed conditions, about 300-380 kW of maximum
decay heat is generated by the FPs vented depending
on both the interval time of the vent operation and the
vent size. This shows that the CFVS should have the
capability to treat that amount of decay heat in the
vent cases presumed.
603NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.45  NO.5  OCTOBER 2013
SONG et al., Overview of Containment Filtered Vent under Severe Accident Conditions at Wolsong NPP Unit 1
Fig. 6. Accumulated Mass of Hydrogen Released from RB
Failure
Fig. 7. Accumulated Mass of Steam Vented from CFVS
Operation
Fig. 8. Decay Heat of Fission Products Vented from CFVS
Operation
6. CONCLUSIONS
Accidents involving severe core damage might result
in higher pressures than those of the DBA and challenge the
integrity of the containment. As one of the post-Fukushima
action considerations, setting up a CFVS for an existing
nuclear power plant has been proposed for mitigating the
critical results of severe accidents. In particular, a PHWR has
been evaluated as vulnerable to steam over pressurization,
and the first CFVS was addressed for a Korean PHWR plant
(Wolsong unit-1). Considering the risk assessments, an
overpressure failure of the containment from steam and
noncondensible gases is the principal contributor to the
risk, and establishing both a venting of the containment
and a removal of the aerosol can greatly reduce the risk.
The main conclusions can be summarized as follows:
• The CFVS shall have the capacity to keep the con-
tainment pressure below the design pressure during
the mission time (which is at least three months after
the scram in Wolsong-1). In addition, the CFVS shall
have the capacity to treat or remove the hydrogen,
steam, and FP decay heat vented from the RB, such
that no performance degradation should occur during
an autonomous operation time (This autarky time for
autonomous operation in Wolsong-1 is at least three
days (for intermittent cycling operation) or one and
a half days (for continuous operation) into the acci-
dent). This study evaluated the CFVS capability re-
quirements that the containment integrity be main-
tained in a severe core damage scenario of an SBO.
This study also suggests how the system actuation and
closure pressures should be determined to ensure
adequate protection from an over pressure of the
containment.
• Steam over pressurization is a significant threat to
the CANDU RB integrity if no recovery action can
be taken for a long period of time, as in the Fukushima
incident. As the CFVS is introduced to Wolsong-1
as a mitigation strategy to deal with the threat of
over pressurization (particularly slow steam pressur-
ization), the probability of no RB failure is predicted
to increase from 35% to about 90% even after severe
core damage occurs in Wolsong-1, if the venting
strategy is successful.
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